This paper presents a refinement of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). While the original BIC selects models on the basis of complexity and fit, the so-called prior-adapted BIC allows us to choose among statistical models that differ on three scores: fit, complexity, and model size. The prior-adapted BIC can therefore accommodate comparisons among statistical models that differ only in the admissible parameter space, e.g., for choosing among models with different constraints on the parameters. The paper ends with an application of this idea to a well-known puzzle from the psychology of reasoning, the conjunction fallacy.
Statistical model selection concerns the choice among a set of statistical models. A model consists of a set of statistical hypotheses, where each hypothesis imposes a probability distribution over sample space. There are several ways of choosing among the models, leading to several so-called information criteria (ICs) that may regulate the choice. All of these are comparative: their absolute numerical values do not have meaning.
By way of introduction, we mention some of the dominant model selection tools. We may choose the model that, under relative entropy distance, brings us closest to the hypothesized true distribution. This distance is approximated by Akaike's information criterion or AIC [Akaike 1973 , Stone 1977 . The AIC can be interpreted naturally in terms of cross-validation and predictive success. The deviance information criterion, or DIC for short [Spiegelhalter 2002] , is based on a similar information-theoretic criterion. Like the AIC, it can be justified in terms of the predictive accuracy of the model, under a particular loss function to express accuracy. Alternatively, we may choose the model that allows us to capture the information contained in the data most efficiently, as proposed by model selection based on the so-called Minimum Description Length or M DL [Grunwald 2007 , Balasubramanian 2005 . Or finally, we may base our choice on the probability of the data averaged for the models at issue, called the marginal likelihoods. The Bayesian information criterion, or BIC [Schwarz 1978 , Raftery 1995 , approximates these likelihoods or, in other formulations, the resulting posterior probabilities over the models.
The selection criteria boil down to a trade-off between model complexity and model fit: we choose the model that optimizes the match between the data and the best fitting hypothesis within the model, but models that are more complex start with a handicap. One of the attractive features of the information criteria sketched above is that they are derived from first principles, and that the trade-off between fit and complexity shows up as a consequence of those starting points rather than being put in by hand. Moreover, it turns out that the trade-off is very similar for a number of different sets of first principles. It shows up in the approximations of entirely different notions, to wit, distance to the truth (AIC), predictive accuracy (DIC), minimum description length (M DL), and marginal likelihood (BIC). All these information criteria use the maximum likelihood of the model as a measure of fit, and for all these ICs the measure for complexity and the resulting penalty are related to the number of free parameters appearing in the statistical model.
The central problem of this paper is that this complexity measure is not effective if we want to compare models that do not differ in dimensionality, but merely in terms of the size of the admissible parameter space. There are numerous practical cases in which scientists are facing a choice between models differing in this way [Gelfand et al 1992] , e.g., when comparing models that impose order constraints on the parameters [Hoijtink et al 2008 , van de Schoot 2010 . Model selection criteria are in need of refinement if they are supposed to apply to such cases of model selection as well.
For the information criteria AIC and DIC, and for model selection based on the notion of minimum description length (M DL), adapted versions are available, or being developed, in which comparisons between models that differ in size can be accommodated [Anraku 1999 , Balasubramanian 2005 . The idea is that models that admit a smaller range of parameter values are simpler, much like models that include a smaller absolute number of parameters. By reworking the derivations of the traditional model selection criteria, Anraku et al and van de Schoot et al arrive at respectively an AIC and a DIC that, next to model fit, express the complexity of the model in terms of dimensionality and in terms of the size of the admissible parameter space. The work of [Rissanen 1996] and [Balasubramanian 2005 ] goes even further. They identify terms that con-cern the inherent complexity of the model in virtue of model size as well as parametric complexity.
The object of the present paper is to accomplish something similar for the BIC: to reconsider its derivation in order to arrive at a prior-adapted BIC that expresses complexity in terms of both dimensionality and size, so that comparisons of the above type become possible. As may be expected from the strong similarity between M DL and BIC, we will arrive at an expression for complexity that is similar to the one that model selection based on M DL arrives at: it includes the relative size of the range of parameter values. However, differences emerge over the exact interpretation of the notion of size and the way in which it surfaces in the derivation. The results will give rise to a change in our understanding of statistical simplicity. Another novelty of this paper is in the application of model selection ideas to a well-known puzzle originally discussed by [Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982] : Linda the bank teller. The developments of the present paper suggest a particular take on this puzzle.
The setup of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we review the BIC and clarify some interpretative issues surrounding it. In Section 3 we say exactly what models are at stake in the paper, and pinpoint the problem that is resolved in it. In section 4 we propose the prior-adapted BIC as a solution. Then in section 5 we interpret the additional term in the BIC as a particular kind of penalty, and we briefly contrast this penalty with the one featuring in M DL. In section 6 we apply the result to the puzzle of Linda the bank teller. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Introduction to the BIC
We introduce the BIC and resolve an interpretative issue. This prepares for the application of the BIC to models with truncated priors.
BIC as approximate marginal likelihood
Let W, F, P be a probability space. We have W as a set of basic elements, often taken as possible worlds, and F an algebra over these worlds, often understood as a language. Sets of worlds are propositions in the language.
Over the algebra we can define a probability function P , which takes the elements of the algebra, namely the propositions, as arguments. Let D be the algebra for the data samples D n in which n indexes the number of observations in the sample. Let H the algebra based on a partition of statistical hypotheses H θ , and M the algebra based on a partition of models M i . The part of the algebra concerned with statistical theory is denoted T ⊂ M × H: it consists of a number of models, each including a distinct subset of statistical hypotheses. In the full algebra, each pair of model and hypothesis is associated with the full algebra of samples, so F = T × D.
We can define the hypotheses and models by means of so-called characteristic functions, c θ and c i , that assign a world w the value 1 if it belongs to the hypothesis H θ and the model M i respectively:
A model M i is connected to a collection of statistical hypotheses H θ , labeled by parameters θ whose values are restricted to some set of values S i . In the following it will be convenient to refer to the range of hypotheses associated with a model M i :
In this setup, a model covers a range of hypotheses as usual, but the hypotheses and ranges of hypotheses need not be strictly included in the models.
They may intersect with any number of models.
The probability function P ranges over samples, hypotheses and models alike. But statistical hypotheses are a special type of set: they dictate the full probability assignment over the algebra of data samples associated with them. For every model with which the hypothesis intersects, we have a so-called likelihood of the hypothesis H θ for the data D n ,
where f is some function of the sample D n and the statistical parameters θ. Depending on the nature of the data D n and the hypotheses H θ , the function P will have to be a probability density function that can handle conditions with measure 0. To simplify the expositions below, we will assume that the observations are independent and identically distributed. Note that the model index i does not show up in the function f : the likelihoods of a hypothesis are independent of the model of which the hypothesis is part.
By the law of total probability we can now compute the marginal likelihood of the model, i.e., probability of the data D n conditional on the model
The marginal likelihood is the average of the likelihoods of the hypotheses in the model, weighted with the prior probability density over the hypotheses within the model. The marginal likelihood of a model is the central mathematical notion in this paper.
The idea behind the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is that models are selected on the basis of their posterior probability, as determined by their marginal likelihood. The BIC is eventually an approximation of twice the negative logarithm of the marginal likelihood of the model:
We choose the model for which the BIC is lowest. The expressionθ, or more specificallyθ(D n , M i ), signifies the maximum likelihood estimator, a function that maps the data D n onto the hypothesis H θ ∈ R i for which
in the BIC is the likelihood for data D n of the maximum likelihood estimate Hθ within the model M i , where this estimate is itself based on those data D n .
Loosely speaking, the expression d i log(n) corrects for the fact that as an approximation of the marginal likelihood, the likelihood of the best estimate is too optimistic. The parameter d i is the dimensionality of the model, i.e., the number of independent parameters in the model, and n is the number of independent observations in the data D n . In the terms P (D n |Hθ ∩ M i ) and d i log(n), the BIC reflects both the fit and the complexity of the model.
The likelihoodist information criterion?
Bayesian methods concern probability assignments to statistical hypotheses and not just to data samples. In the foregoing, hypotheses are assigned a probability while themselves being associated with a probability assignment over the data. One reason to call the above information criterion Bayesian is that it depends on such probability assignments over statistical hypotheses,
Another reason is that the marginal likelihoods enable us to compute the posterior probabilities over the models:
On the assumption of a uniform probability over candidate models, P (M 1 ) = P (M 0 ), the likelihood ratio and the ratio of posteriors are equal. The logarithm of the ratio of posteriors is then approximated by the difference between the BICs of the models. Both interpretations of the BIC are viable.
This application of the BIC requires a specific setup of the probability space. Posterior model probabilities do not make much sense if the models under comparison are literally nested. Imagine that we had defined the the following sets of hypotheses as our models:
whatever the data. While we can still meaningfully compare the marginal likelihoods, a Bayesian comparison of posterior model probabilities for such sets of hypotheses is uninformative.
One possible response here is to replace R 0 by the set
The sets R 1 and R 2 are indeed disjunct, and because we have P (R 1 |R 0 ) = 0 for any smooth probability density over R 0 , the models R 0 and R 2 yield the same marginal likelihoods. However, in the setup of the probability space given above, we need not resort to redefining the models. To our mind, a more attractive response is to carefully define the models that are involved in the comparison, and to not confuse such models with sets of hypotheses.
The sets H θ may overlap with both model M 0 and model M 1 .
While this makes posterior model probability a perfectly cogent notion, the BIC of a model remains primarily an approximation of marginal likelihood and not of the posterior of a model. For this reason, it is perhaps better to refer to the BIC as a likelihoodist information criterion, thus avoiding the interpretative problems with posterior model probability altogether.
But here is not the place for proposing such terminological revisions. It suffices to note that the BIC is concerned with likelihoods as an expression of empirical support, and that a probabilistic comparison of seemingly overlapping models is not problematic, provided that we define our probability space cautiously.
Comparing models with truncated priors
This paper concerns a particular application of the BIC, namely the comparison of models that do not differ in dimensionality but only in the admissible range of hypotheses. In such cases there is a problematic discrepancy between the BICs and the marginal likelihoods of the models.
Truncated priors
The comparisons of this paper involve models whose ranges of hypotheses are nested, and whose priors only differ by a normalisation factor. Such comparisons are well-known from the practice of science, as for example in [Klugkist, Laudy and Hoijtink 2005] .
By nested ranges of hypotheses, we mean that the range of hypotheses in model M 0 encompasses the range associated with model M 1 , or equivalently, that the range of model M 1 is constrained relative to that of model M 0 .
Formally, we have R 1 R 0 . The following encompassing and constrained ranges are a good example:
Calling the associated models M 0 encompassing and M 1 constrained suggests that they are themselves nested, but in the present setup this is not so. Following Equation (1), the models are disjunct sets. For θ ≤ 1 2 the hypotheses H θ intersect with both models, while for θ > We tell apart encompassing and constrained models by the range of hypotheses R i : the models are both part of a probability space with a single probability function P . Effectively, these models differ in the regions over which the prior is nonzero. The following abbreviation of the conditional probability function will be useful in the derivations below:
The probability density P i (H θ )dH θ is nonzero over H θ ∈ R i and zero everywhere else in R 0 \ R i . For the likelihoods we simply have
We impose one further restriction to the class of model comparisons at stake in this paper: the prior P 1 is a truncated version of the prior P 0 . Take any pair of encompassing and constrained models M 0 and M 1 , and define a proper prior density P 0 (H θ )dH θ over the encompassing model M 0 . This prior can be used to compute an associated prior over a constrained model M 1 , the so-called truncated prior, as follows:
where
Within the domain that the two models have in common, the prior over the constrained model has the same functional form as the prior over the encompassing model. But it is normalized relative to the parameter space of the constrained model. Because of this normalisation, we have that
The constraint is the only difference between them.
To illustrate the second restriction with the models of Equations (4) 
Peaked likelihoods and concentrated posteriors
We add two more restrictions on the model comparisons that are at stake in this paper, one concerning the posterior probability over the model M 0 and one concerning the likelihood function. Their import is that with increasing sample size, the posterior probability within model M 0 will collect around a unique maximum likelihood hypothesis Hθ.
First, we require that as the sample size n grows, the posterior probability in the encompassing model gets concentrated around the maximum likelihood pointθ. Consider an environment B(θ, r) = H θ ∈ R 0 : |θ −θ| < r for some fixed r > 0. The model M 0 must be such that
Note that r can be chosen arbitrarily small. The model M 0 is such that in the long run almost all probability will be collected inside this arbitrarily small environment around the maximum likelihood estimate. Importantly, if Hθ ∈ R 1 , then the equivalence of the likelihood function and, up to normalisation, of the prior over the models M 0 and M 1 makes sure that the same limit statement holds for P 1 (B(θ, r)|D n ).
Second, for increasingly large sample size n we require that the likelihood function over the model M 0 is increasingly sharply peaked around θ(D n , M 0 ). Formally, we assume for all θ =θ that
This requirement may look superfluous, given that we have already assumed Equation (6). But with a sufficiently non-smooth likelihood function it is possible to satisfy the requirement on the posterior for B(θ, r) while maintaining an ever smaller patch of the parameter space outside B(θ, r) at almost equally high likelihood. The requirement of Equation (7) determines that such patches do not exist. In turn, this requirement does not entail that for growing sample size n the posterior probability gets concentrated around the maximum likelihood point: without the assumption of Equation (6) the maximum likelihood might itself be an isolated peak. Relative to it, the peak around which all the posterior probability is collected may have negligible height.
We want to stress that the two requirements above are nothing out of the ordinary. Most models for independent and identically distributed trials for which the likelihood function
is sufficiently smooth will satisfy them. We rely on the blanket requirements because detailing the exact conditions on the asymptotic behaviour of the likelihood function presents us with an unnecessary detour.
BIC for truncated priors
In what follows we will be concerned with a problem in the application of the BIC to model comparisons of the above kind. In short, the problem is that the difference between the encompassing and constrained models always shows up in their marginal likelihoods, while their BIC is in some cases equal. Therefore, if the BIC is to accommodate the comparison of such models, it needs to be refined.
To explain the problem, we observe that the marginal likelihood of models that differ in terms of a truncated prior are intimately related. We start by rewriting the marginal likelihood of M 1 :
So for both marginal likelihoods we can restrict attention to the probability function P 0 . By Bayes' theorem the term appearing under the integration sign is
The term P 0 (D n ) can be placed outside the scope of the integral, so the functional form of the terms within the scope is that of the posterior distribution over R 0 . Note further that
so that we can derive
to see if its behaviour is matched by the behaviour of the BICs for the two models. We distinguish two regions in which the maximum likelihood estimateθ(D n , M 0 ) may be located, namely inside and outside the domain
We concentrate on the good news first. Say that the maximum likelihood estimate lies outside R 1 , or more formally,θ(D n , M 0 ) ∈ S 0 \ S 1 . Following
Equation (6), we can always choose r such that B(θ, r) ⊂ R 0 \ R 1 . From Equation (6) and the fact that
for all n, we conclude that for increasing sample size n the ratio of marginal likelihoods of Equation (8) is unbounded. Fortunately, the BIC replicates the behaviour of the marginal likelihoods in this case. From the requirement of Equation (7) we have that the likelihood of the maximum likelihood hypothesis within M 1 is negligible in comparison to the likelihood of the maximum likelihood hypothesis within M 0 :
Moreover, the maximum likelihood term is dominant in both BICs: it grows with O(n) while the complexity term d i log(n) is the same for both models.
So we can derive that BIC(M 1 ) − BIC(M 0 ) tends to infinity for growing sample size n, thus matching the behaviour of the marginal likelihood.
But now consider the case in which the maximum likelihood estimate lies inside the domain R 1 , that is,θ(D n , M 0 ) ∈ S 1 . We can always choose r such that B(θ, r) ⊂ R 1 . From Equation (6) and the fact that P B(θ, r)|D n < P 0 (R 1 |D n )
we conclude that for increasing sample size n the ratio of marginal likelihoods of Equation (8) tends to the value P 0 (R 1 ). We thus expect to see a difference of 2 log P 0 (R 1 ) between the values of the BIC for the two models as well.
But the BICs of the two models are exactly the same! The maximum likelihood terms are equal, because R 1 includes the maximum likelihood estimate Hθ. And the penalty terms are equal, because the encompassing and constrained models have an equal number of free parameters.
This is the problematic discrepancy between marginal likelihood and the BIC, alluded to at the beginning of this section. If the maximum likelihood θ(D n , M 0 ) lies inside the region R 1 , the ratio of marginal likelihoods of encompassing and constrained models tends to the value P 0 (R 1 ). But this difference is not found back in the BICs of the models.
Prior-adapted BIC
In the foregoing we derived how the marginal likelihoods for models with truncated priors behave, so we know what a more refined version of the BIC must look like. There may seem little point in an independent derivation of such a refined BIC, as a specialised approximation to something we already know about. Nevertheless, we will in the following closely scrutinize the original derivation of the BIC, based on [Jeffreys 1961 ], [Schwarz 1978 ], [Kass and Wasserman 1992] and primarily [Raftery 1995] , and tweak this derivation in order to capture the effect of a truncated prior on the marginal likelihood. The gain of this is not so much that we thereby arrive at a new model selection tool. Something like that would require a much more extensive motivation. Rather it is that we can draw a parallel between the original BIC and the newly defined P BIC, and thus motivate a particular refinement of our notion of statistical simplicity.
Original derivation
As spelled out in the foregoing, the BIC of a model M i is an approximation of the marginal likelihood of the model M i for data D n . In the original derivation, as reproduced in [Raftery 1995] , it is shown that
As before, d i is the dimension of the model, n is the sample size, and θ is shorthand for the maximum likelihood pointθ(D n , M i ). The quantity |I| denotes the determinant of the expected Fisher information matrix for a single observation D 1 , evaluated at the maximum likelihood esti-
The expression O(n k ), finally, represents terms for which
The first term on the right hand side of Equation (9) is of order O(n), and the second term is of order O(log n). The next three terms in Equation (9) are of order O(1), and the last represents everything of order O(
Removing the terms with order O(1) or less and multiplying by −2 gives the BIC of Equation (3). The terms of order O(1) or less in Equation (9) can be considered as an error of the estimation of log P (D n |M i ). Arguably, the errors can be ignored because the first two terms will dominate the equation as n tends to infinity.
As shown in [Kass and Wasserman 1992] and [Raftery 1995] , in some cases the terms of order O(1) can be eliminated by the choice of a suitable prior. If we choose a distribution with meanθ and variance matrix I −1 , we have that
so that the terms of order O(1) cancel each other out. Moreover, we have an independent motivation for this choice of prior. Roughly speaking, the variance matrix I −1 expresses that the prior contains the same amount of information as a single observation, while the meanθ expresses that this information is in line with the average of the data set D n . In other words, the prior expresses that we have little but adequate prior knowledge.
Including the prior in the BIC
The key idea of the prior-adapted BIC is that this last step in the original derivation must be omitted. The effect of the truncated prior can be found back among the terms of order O(1). Specifically, it can be identified in the prior probability density over the model. Recall that
for any value of θ ∈ R 1 and therefore also forθ. We include terms of order O(1) in the BIC, thus creating a prior-adapted BIC or P BIC for short:
where P (Hθ|M i ) is the value of the density function at the point Hθ within M i . If we apply the P BIC to the comparison of models with truncated priors, we recover the difference between the marginal likelihoods derived in the foregoing. To see this, note that log P (Hθ|M 1 ) = log P (Hθ|M 0 ) − log P (R 1 |M 0 )
by Equation (10). As before, ifθ ∈ R 0 \ R 1 then the first term completely dominates the comparison of the BICs of the models. But if we have that θ ∈ R 1 , the first two terms in the P BIC are equal for the encompassing and the constrained model. In that case the third term creates a difference of
in accordance with the ratio of the marginal likelihoods of Equation (8).
By including terms of lower order in the approximation of the marginal likelihood, we thus recover the behaviour of the marginal likelihood.
The remaining task is to show that in applications of the P BIC to model comparisons, the other terms of order O(1) in Equation (9) are the same for the two models. The term d log(2π) is clearly the same, as it only depends on the dimension which is equal for the encompassing and constrained model. We concentrate on the term log |I|. It is the expectation value of how sharply the likelihood function is peaked around the maximum likelihood of one observation, or loosely speaking, it expresses how much information is contained in a single observation. Formally,
where the expectation is taken over D 1 distributed according to P (D 1 |Hθ ∩ M i ). Clearly, there will be no difference between the two models here, be- A potential worry with this quick arrival at the P BIC may be that the accuracy of the approximation of Equation (9) is different for the encompassing and the constrained models, and that this introduces further errors of order O(1) into the approximation. But that worry is unnecessary. Nothing in the accuracy of the approximation, in terms of the order of errors, hinges on the exact region of admissible parameter values.
More details on the error terms
To substantiate the above claim, we now follow the original derivation of the BIC in more detail, and discuss possible differences between the encompassing and constrained model. This discussion is not self-contained but relies heavily on the derivation in [Raftery 1995] .
The derivation of the BIC employs the so-called Laplacian method for integrals on a Taylor expansion of the function
as it appears in the marginal likelihood. Its functional form is identical to that of the posterior distribution. This leads to
withθ the value where the function g(θ) is maximal, or in other words the mode of the posterior distribution, and
Note that the value ofθ may be different for the encompassing and the constrained model. However, the derivation itself is uncontroversially applicable to both models.
In the derivation it is then assumed that the mode of the posteriorθ is close to the maximum likelihood estimatorθ for large n, so that g(θ) can be approximated by g(θ). For the encompassing and the constrained model, this assumption is warranted by Equation (6), which states that almost all posterior probability will eventually end up arbitrarily close to the maximum likelihood point. After taking the logarithm, we obtain
thus recovering three terms in Equation (9) The eventual terms of Equation (9), namely − d i 2 log(n) − 1 2 log |I|, result from the approximation
in Equation (12). Here again, the evaluation atθ in the derivative A is replaced by the evaluationθ in the derivative I, but we just argued that this is unproblematic. Apart from that, the approximation is based on two further assumptions. One is that the observations in D n are independent and identically distributed, so that we can restrict attention to one observation.
The other is that for large n, the second derivative of g(θ) is dominated by the likelihood factor, so that we can omit P (H θ |M i ) from the derivative.
Both assumptions apply equally to the encompassing and the constrained model. The first was assumed all along. As for the second, recall that the priors of the encompassing and constrained models only differ by a constant factor, and that the likelihood functions of the models are equal.
Therefore, if the assumption is indeed satisfied in the encompassing model, then it is also satisfied in the constrained model, and vice versa. Again, the approximation does not introduce any differences between the two models.
The role of the prior
We conclude that the prior-adapted BIC adequately approximates comparisons of the marginal likelihood of encompassing and constrained models:
it yields a difference of 2 log P (M 1 |M 0 ) in favour of the constrained model.
As indicated before, we do not think this is enough motivation for using P BIC across the board: for other model comparisons the terms of order O(1) will differ in ways that have not been connected to natural aspects of model selection. In this section we merely argue that the term that shows up in comparisons between encompassing and constrained models has a very natural interpretation. It can lead us to redefine the notion of statistical simplicity accordingly.
Recall that the term d i log(n) is often interpreted as a penalty for complexity, or conversely, as a term that affords simpler models a head start.
The idea is that models with fewer parameters exclude particular statistical possibilities, therefore run more risk of failing to accommodate the data, and hence deserve pole position. We argue that the very same consideration applies to the constrained model M 1 when compared to the encompassing This interpretation is in line with the model selection tool based on M DL, as derived and presented in [Rissanen 1996 ], [Myung et al. 2000] and [Balasubramanian 2005 ]. In the M DL quantity expressing the relative merits of models, we find very similar terms:
Specifically, the term J(H θ ) is a reparameterisation invariant prior over the space of hypotheses R 0 . So the third term above effectively measures the volume of the range of hypotheses R i , relative to the full range R 0 . This term matches the term 2 log P (R i |M 0 ) in the expression of the P BIC. Similarly, the term involving the Fisher information matrix matches the term log |I| in the original BIC.
Such parallels are a far cry from showing some kind of equivalence between the prior-adapted BIC and the model selection tool deriving from M DL, or from bringing P BIC up to the level of the M DL tool. For a more rigorous treatment of the relation between the approaches of M DL and BIC, we refer the reader to [Grunwald 2007 ]. For present purposes, we restrict attention to some salient differences between the two approaches.
One marked difference is in the interpretation of the Fisher information matrix. In the discussion of the P BIC above this term is largely ignored, because it is the same for the models whose comparisons were the intended application of the P BIC, namely encompassing and constrained models.
There are, however, numerous cases in which this term is relevant, and in fact very interesting. Very loosely speaking, the term expresses the sensitivity of the maximum likelihood estimate to small variations in the data. As argued in the M DL literature, higher sensitivity is penalised because it is associated with less reliable estimations, and accordingly with a more complex parameterisation over the space of hypotheses. Unfortunately, we must leave the exact role and interpretation of the Fisher information matrix in the P BIC to future research.
In the context of the present paper, another difference between M DL and P BIC merits more attention. Both model selection tools feature a term that expresses the size of the range of hypotheses within the model.
But the nature of those terms is very different. In the M DL approach, the size term appears as the integral of an independently motivated reference prior over the model M 0 . In the P BIC approximation, by contrast, the size term derives from the way in which the priors over the encompassing and constrained models M 0 and M 1 are related. In turn, this relation between the priors is fixed for the reason that a comparison between the encompassing and constrained models should only hinge on the constraints. They make up the difference between the two models. Therefore, the comparison should not be affected by other differences between the priors than their normalisation.
This ties in with another difference between the two approaches, concerning the objectivity of the notion of size. In the M DL approach, the size term associated with a particular model is determined entirely by the independently motivated reference prior over M 0 . The effective size of any range of hypotheses is determined by the density of statistically distinguishable hypotheses within that part. MOre precisely, the measure over R 0 is determined by the requirement that all equidistant hypotheses must be equally distinguishable throughout R 0 , where the degree of distinguishability is equated with relative entropy. Against this, the size term in the P BIC, written P (R 1 |M 0 ), is essentially subjective because the prior over M 0 can be chosen at will. This has some repercussions for the interpretation of the size term in the P BIC. It expresses not size per se, objectively, but rather the subjectively perceived size of the constrained model M 1 , as determined by the subjectively chosen prior over the model M 0 .
Application to the conjunction fallacy
There is a nice parallel between the present discussion and a discussion in the psychology of reasoning on the so-called conjunction fallacy. In a nutshell, the problem is that in some cases people intuitively judge one statement more probable than some other statement that is logically entailed by it. A well-known example is the case of "Linda the Bank Teller": against the background of particular information about Linda, namely that she is 31 years old, single, outspoken, very bright, concerned with social issues, and so on, psychological subjects rank "Linda is a feminist bank teller" more probable than "Linda is a bank teller" [Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982] . Needless to say, this response is incorrect because the proposition that Linda is a bank teller is logically entailed by her being a feminist bank teller.
The parallel between this puzzle and the model comparisons of the foregoing will be apparent. Much like "Linda is a feminist bank teller" cannot be more probable than "Linda is a bank teller" full stop, it seems that the constrained model M 1 cannot be more probable than the encompassing model M 0 (cf. [Romeijn and van de Schoot 2008] for an earlier discussion of this parallel). Now one possible response is to resort to the probability space devised in the present paper and maintain that there is, in virtue of the parallel, no real puzzle in the case of Linda. Following this paper, we can provide a somewhat contrived semantics for the two propositions about Linda, such that they do not overlap.
We think that such a response misses the point. Puzzles like the one about Linda invite us to reconsider what the key components of our reasoning are, and how these components can be framed. They are not the objects, but rather the catalysts of investigation. So instead, we employ the parallel between the conjunction fallacy and the model comparisons of this paper to briefly explore a particular development in confirmation theory. We have no intention here to review the extensive literature on the conjunction fallacy or to suggest new solutions. We focus on one particular analysis of the fallacy, given by [Crupi, Fitelson, and Tentori 2009] . They provide an attractive explanation of the experimental effects by suggesting that people do not respond by ranking the two propositions at stake on their respective probability, but rather on their confirmatory qualities. The proposition ranked first is the one that receives the strongest confirmation from the background knowledge provided.
The perspective of model selection by the P BIC aligns with, and thereby reinforces the analysis of Tentori. The core of this analysis is that the propositions, e.g., those about Linda, are not compared on their probability, but on their likelihoods for the data about Linda. People rank Linda being a feminist bank teller, F ∩ B, higher than her being a bank teller, B, in the light of data D because they compare P (D|F ∩ B) and P (D|B) and judge the former higher than the latter. And this may be the case despite the fact that F ∩ B entails B. In our view, the parallel between the conjunction fallacy and the foregoing can be employed to give a further explanation of the relative sizes of the likelihoods. It seems not too far-fetched to portray the proposition B as a model, comprising of many different hypotheses concerning how Linda might be, each associated with its own probability for the data about Linda. In the same vein, the statement F ∩ B is a constrained model within B. The key point is that within this constrained model B there are more hypotheses that assign the data about Linda a high probability, so that the marginal likelihood of B for the data about Linda is higher.
It may well be that, once in possession of a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. The benefits of this particular representation of the conjunction fallacy are perhaps minimal. Nevertheless, we think that the general idea of representing propositions as models is illuminating, and deserves further investigation. An illustration of its value is provided by [Henderson et al. 2010] , who represent scientific theories as models in order to illuminate issues in confirmation theory and reductionism by means of hierarchical Bayesian modelling. We think that this idea invites the use of model selection tools within probabilistic confirmation theory. It will be interesting to see if these tools can shed new light on old problems in confirmation theory, such as the seeming conflict between likeliness and loveliness (cf. [Lipton 2004] ) and the interplay between accommodation and prediction (cf. [Sober and Hitchcock 2004] ).
Conclusion
There are three cases when comparing encompassing to constrained models: the models differ in maximum likelihood, they differ in dimensionality, or they merely differ in the range of admissible hypotheses. In the first two of these cases the prior-adapted BIC, or P BIC for short, boils down to the original BIC: relative to the contribution from the likelihood and dimension terms, the additional terms vanish. For the last case, however, none of the terms in the P BIC differ except for the prior term. This term creates a difference between the models related to size, which allows us to choose between the models.
We have argued that the behaviour of the P BIC is in line with the behaviour of the original BIC, and fitting for the comparison of encompassing and constrained models. In such a comparison, it replicates the behaviour of the marginal likelihood, which it is supposed to approximate, by returning a difference of 2 log P (R 1 |M 0 ). Moreover, this term can be interpreted along the same lines as the term that involves the number of free parameters, d i log(n). Both terms effect a head start for models that exclude statistical possibilities, and therefore run the risk of failing to accommodate the data.
Finally, it was seen that the P BIC is naturally aligned with model selection tools based on M DL. However, this is not enough to motivate replacing the BIC by the P BIC across the board. There are many applications for which the behavior of the additional terms has not been interpreted or even investigated.
Instead, we submit that the benefit of deriving the P BIC is conceptual.
As argued, we can think of the prior term as pertaining to subjectively perceived model size. It is the natural development of the dimensionality of a model, which pertains to a size at a different order of magnitude. We have shown that, in trading simplicity against fit, we cannot act as if one notion of size fits all. Next to reduced dimensionality, a reduced model size gives a small but non-negligible contribution to the simplicity term in the model comparison. We believe that this adds to a clarification of the elusive concept of simplicity in model selection.
